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How presidential powers can legally expand without constitutional amendment.

CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT
Cass Sunstein
In the United States, the president is controlled by the
Constitution and is in all respects subordinate to it. Insofar as it deals with presidential power, however, the
American Constitution has proved to be a highly malleable document. With very few exceptions, the constitutional provisions relating to the president have not been
changed at all since they were ratified in 1787, but in
1993 those provisions do not mean what they meant in
1787. The Constitution is a legal document, and it is
enforced judicially, but its meaning was not fixed when it
was ratified. In particular, the contemporary president
has far broader powers than the original Constitution
contemplated. It is remarkable but true that large-scale
changes in the authority of the president have been
brought about without changes in the constitutional text
but, nevertheless, without illegality.
This is a paradox. Is it not clear that constitutional
changes, if not textual, are illegal? The paradox has considerable relevance to Eastern Europe. The framers of
the American Constitution feared legislative power most
of all, but from well-known events in the twentieth century it is possible to conclude that it is presidential power
that presents the greatest risks for liberty and democracy.
The president is the most visible leader in the nation by
far; he is often the only person in government with a
national constituency; and this visibility can lead to a
kind of "cult" that threatens constitutionalism itself. On
the other hand, a strong president is in a unique position
to accomplish enormous good, and it is possible to think
that in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR, a strong president is a precondition for necessary reforms.
How to produce a strong presidency while limiting
the relevant risks is a major task for postcommunist constitutionalism. There are of course significant complexities here. With the exception of the nations of the former
Soviet Union, the pattern in Eastern European nations is
basically parliamentary, and the president is largely cer-

emonial (at least in comparison to the American president). In the nations of what used to be the USSR, a
president-part of a division between the executive and
the legislature-has a more important role. But even
where the president is largely ceremonial, there will be
opportunities for accretions of power over time. Any
particular constitutional arrangement is unlikely to be
fixed over time.
There is some dispute about whether the task of producing a strong president without endangering liberty
has been successfully accomplished in the United States.
Some people think that the American president is much
too powerful; others think that America has a weak president who is unable to accomplish the tasks for which he is
elected. This debate raises complex questions that I cannot discuss here. However those questions may be resolved, it is clear that the original understanding of the
presidency called for much less presidential authority than
is taken for granted today. Although the prominent
American founder, Alexander Hamilton, sought a powerful presidency, and although the new Constitution created an executive where the Articles of Confederation
had not, the original American president was exceptionally weak by contemporary standards. Consider the following points, showing the contrast between the eighteenth and twentieth-century American presidencies.
1. In the founding period, the president was supposed to have sharply limited authority in domestic affairs, partly because the federal government as a whole
had sharply limited authority in the domestic arena. Basic regulation of the economy was to come from state
governments, especially from state courts elaborating the
common law of tort, contract, and property. Today, by
contrast, the president is a principal national lawmakersimply because of a shift in power toward the nation. In
implementing national law, the executive branch issues
an extraordinary range of regulations affecting the na-
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tional economy-in large part because of the economic
interdependence among various regions, which is now
generally acknowledged. It is a simple truth that the
national government has far more authority than the
framers of the Constitution originally envisaged. It is
equally, if less simply, true that as a result of this shift, the
president himself has assumed an array of duties and
powers not within the original contemplation of the
Constitution's authors.
2. In issuing regulations and indeed in all his official
acts, the president needs congressional (or constitutional)
authorization. He cannot exceed any limits that Congress has laid down. But often Congress offers very vague
guidance. The president therefore has a great deal of
discretion. Particularly in the latter half of the twentieth
century, courts have been reluctant to strike down laws
on the basis of the "nondelegation doctrine," which required clear standards from the legislature. The downfall of the nondelegation doctrine has meant that the president can exercise tremendous policy-making discretion
in the domestic sphere. This sphere includes regulation
of the environment, energy, occupational safety and
health, communications, and much else.
3. The framers of the Constitution probably wanted
to allow Congress to limit the president's authority over
the many high-level officials who implement the laws
enacted by Congress. This might seem to be a technical
matter, but it has enormous importance. If the Secretary
of the Treasury can be controlled by the Congress but not
by the president, the allocation of national powers ismuch
changed. It is now generally agreed, however, that the
presidenthas broadpower over all high-level oficials who implement the law. The heads of the cabinet, and of most executive agencies, can be discharged by the president whenever the president chooses. Moreover, Congress has no
authority to discharge them or to prevent the president
from doing so. (Of course both the president and all
implementing officials must obey the instructions laid
down by Congress.) The result is that most administration of the laws-an extremely large and important category-is subject to the will of the president.
4. It is now generally understood that the president
will submit to Congress both (a) a proposed budget and
(b) a great deal of proposed legislation. As a result, the
president now has a formidable role in the enactment of
national legislation. The Constitution contains no ex-

plicit provisions on these points, but it was not originally
believed that the president would submit a budget or
propose legislation. It was hardly believed that the president would have these powers of initiative, granting him
considerable power over the content of national law. The
president's current power of initiative, with respect to the
budget and lawmaking, is quite fundamental. (Of course
much legislation is initiated by people other than the
president.)
5. The president's power to veto legislation has turned
out to allow him a surprisingly large role in determining
the content of national legislation. The founders of the
Constitution deliberately and explicitly gave the president the veto power. But they did not contemplate its
current importance, and they might well have been
alarmed if they had been forewarned. Their principal
goal was to allow the president to veto laws on constitutional rather than policy grounds, particularly in order to
permit him to prevent Congress from intruding on the
president's constitutional powers. This goal was narrow
indeed; it did not anticipate a situation in which the power
to veto would entail a significant role in lawmaking.
It is not entirely clear that the framers sought to allow
the president to veto legislation solely on the ground that
he disagreed with the policy judgments embodied in it
(though probably the best reading of the history is that
the founders believed that the president could veto legislation on policy grounds). But they thought that this
power would be exercised rarely and only in the most
extreme cases. The founders certainly did not anticipate
the current situation, in which the veto power is a wellunderstood part of all lawmaking and implies a large and
continuous presidential role in lawmaking itself. In short,
the president's authority is greatly augmented by Congress' knowledge that the president can veto legislation of
which he disapproves.
6. With the emergence of the United States as a
world power, the president's foreign affairs authority has
become far more capacious than was originally anticipated. For the most part this is because the powers originally conferred on the president have turned out-in light
of the unanticipated place of the United States in the
world-to mean much more than anyone would have
thought. In addition, however, the president has been
permitted to initiate military activity in circumstances in
which the original understanding would have required
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congressional authorization. On the founding view, a
congressionaldeclaration of war was apreconditionfor war; the
only exception was that the president could act on his
own in order to repel a sudden attack on the United
States. But in the twentieth century, a large amount of
presidential war-making has been allowed without congressional declaration of war.
From all these points we might conclude that the
Constitution, at least in the area of presidential authority,
is no mere lawyer's document. The original understanding has not controlled the future. The Constitution's
meaning is not fixed. It is in large part a function of
historical practices and needs, and of shared understandings over time. Often the power ofthe president is understood to be quite different from what it was, say, twentyfive years earlier.
Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the
president's constitutional power issimply a matter of what
seems to him appropriate or necessary, and not a matter
of law at all. Often the president loses in the Supreme
Court, and in nearly every important case, he has graciously accepted his defeat. To take just a few examples
from the twentieth century: President Nixon was forced
to hand over his own tape-recorded conversations during
the Watergate controversy; President Truman was prevented from seizing the steel mills during the Korean
War; President Eisenhower was banned from stopping
communists from traveling abroad. These defeats are
important in themselves, but they are even more important for the general tone that they set. Every American
president knows that his actions are subject to judicial
review, and this is a large deterrent to illegal conduct.
For purposes ofjudicial review, the president's most
important constitutional duty is "to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed." This provision subordinates
the president to the law. It also requires him to adhere to
the law, both constitutional and statutory.
I have suggested that the changing understandings of
the president's power have occurred without either textual change or flagrant presidential violations of constitutional requirements. I have also suggested that this presents a genuine paradox. We have a president who is
much stronger than the framers of the Constitution anticipated; but at least in general, the current presidency is
not thought, and should not be thought, unconstitutional.
How, then, have the president's powers changed? There

are several possibilities. I outline them here because of
their potential importance to current dilemmas in Eastern Europe. Flexible provisions and silences, allowing
flexible (but not open-ended) interpretation
Many of the changes have occurred because the relevant constitutional provisions are ambiguous, and they
allow adaptation to changing circumstances. For example,
the grant of "executive power" to the president leaves
much uncertainty.
The Constitution also contains important silences.
For example, the Constitution does not discuss whether
the president shall submit a budget. But the document is
not a blank slate. It is clear that the president must obey
the law; it is equally clear that he cannot make law on his
own. It is clear that he cannot (for example) dissolve the
legislature or the Supreme Court when (as is often the
case) they displease him. We should conclude, then, that
constitutional change has occurred in part because of constitutional ambiguities and silences. A constitution that is
not rigid will allow for adaptation without amendment
or illegality.
Emergencies
Many constitutions, including all of those in Eastern Europe, contain emergency provisions, allowing the government to have special powers under conditions of emergency. The American Constitution contains no emergency provisions (although the president is allowed to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus during war). It might
seem natural to think that in spite of the absence of explicit emergency powers, many increases in presidential
authority have occurred as a result of emergencies. In
general, however, the president has not been found to
have special authority to act during emergencies. A domestic crisis-widespread unemployment, social unrestdoes not give the president any new power. There is no
judicial understanding that the president has greater authority if he can point to an emergency situation, or claim
that unusual presidential action is crucial.
Of course, Congress might well decide to confer statutory authority on the president in order to enable him to
respond to a crisis. And Congress has made this decision
in emergencies. In the New Deal period, for example,
Congress gave the president a range of new authorities
because of the perceived need for special responses to the
Great Depression. But the president has not been al-
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lowed to act on his own. An emergency does not give the
president any unilateral powers. A possible lesson is that
constitutionally-granted emergency powers are not necessary and may even be harmful.
Development of the Constitution through caseby-case decisions over time
Some distinguished academic observers (most notably
Harry Wellington and David Strauss) believe that interpretation of the U.S. Constitution depends on particular
judicial decisions, allowing the meaning of the document
to change over time. Indeed, constitutionallaw in America
(and in many other nations as well) has many features of the
common law process.
In that process, a hallmark of Anglo-American legal
systems, no one sets down broad legal rules in advance.
Instead the rules emerge narrowly, as judges decide individual cases. Governing principles come from the process of case-by-case adjudication, and sometimes they cannot be known in advance. Much of constitutional law in
the United States comes not from the constitutional text
itself, but from judge-made constitutional law, interpreting constitutional provisions. For this reason, the meaning of the document is not rigidly fixed when the document is written and ratified.
Something along these lines is certainly true for the
powers of the president, and the system of common law
constitutionalism helps explain the shifting understanding of presidential power. Consider, for example, the
complex question of whether Congress or the president
may discharge high-level public officials (the secretary of
state, the attorney general, the secretary of the interior).
The text of the Constitution does not speak clearly on
this issue; instead, the governing constitutional principles
have been worked out in the process of case-by-case adjudication.
It might be added that much of the president's authority turns not onjudicial decisions at all, but on traditional practices and shared understandings between the
president and Congress. The development of these practices and understandings resembles the process of common law development. It is recognized that a certain
practice "works." Congress and the president endorse the
practice, and the practice therefore operates as a guide for
the future. Of course no such practices may violate the
Constitution where that document speaks with clarity.

Translation
Some people (most notably Lawrence Lessig) have argued that, when circumstances have changed, the Supreme Court must "translate" the original constitutional
text in order to adapt it to the new conditions. Suppose,
for example, that the founders of the Constitution originally sought to allow the president to make war on his
own only for defensive purposes to repel sudden attacks
on the United States. Suppose, too, that in modern conditions, threats to (say) Canada and Mexico are extremely
threatening to the United States because of the strategic
importance of these nations. Or suppose (as many people
believe) that under current conditions, the line between
"offensive" and "defensive" use of the military becomes
extremely thin.
if this is true, perhaps the original constitutional provision, translated into a new context, gives the president
new and broader authority. Ifwe want to adhere to the
original constitutional goal (i.e., to allow the president to
act unilaterally when this is necessary), perhaps the president may act unilaterally, not simply to repel sudden
attacks on the United States, but in any case in which
American interests are at serious risk. Perhaps this view
accounts for many of the changes I have described. Thus,
for example, we might think that the president's authority over the cabinet must expand in an area in which the
cabinet is exercising such extraordinary power over the
nation. Perhaps the expansion isjustified if we are to be
faithful to the founding commitment to political accountability. The "translation" argument raises many complexities, but it has appeared in several Supreme Court
opinions as a way of making sense of the practice of interpretation in changed circumstances.
Several constitutional regimes?
Some people think America has had more than one constitutional regime, that at crucial moments in our history,
the people have inaugurated large-scale changes in the
Constitution. The Civil War, for example, is said to have
inaugurated a Second American Republic, with new understandings of the allocation of power between the nation and the states and with new understandings of individual rights. Some people think that President
Roosevelt's New Deal also produced constitutional
change. In his influential book, We the People:Foundations,
for example, Bruce Ackerman argues that the United
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States has had three constitutional regimes, not simply
one.
If America has had more than one constitutional regime, we might think about presidential power in a somewhat different way. In the New Deal period, for example, the national government appeared to acquire significant new constitutional authority. The president was
a principal beneficiary of this shift, especially insofar as
the Supreme Court refused to enforce the nondelegation
doctrine, which, as noted above, required any legislative
delegations of power to the executive to be narrow and
clear. Some people think that the New Deal effectively
amended the Constitution, giving the president a range
of new powers.
Conclusion
There are some diverse explanations of the changing nature of constitutional power in the hands of the American president. I think that the most promising explanations stress the flexibility of the original text and the process of common law adjudication. If these are the best
explanations, it seems clear that a special advantage of the
original constitutional provisions governing the president
is that they allow adaptation over time. Moreover, it
emerges that one of the virtues of the American constitutional experience is the process of case-by-case adjudication, giving the meaning of constitutional provisions
through close encounter with particular cases.
What lessons can be drawn from this experience for
Eastern Europe? It is hazardous to think that the experience of one nation has any lessons at all for another; there

are many distinctive features to the American experiment in constitutionalism, and it is reasonable to think
that few general lessons can be drawn from what has
happened in the United States. But if we are to draw
lessons, perhaps two are of special importance. The first
involves the limited effects ofconstitutionaltext, at least over
time. Constitutional meaning depends, in large part, on
shared understandings and practices, and most of these
will not be in the constitution itself. Although the Constitution is a legal document, there will be a great deal of
opportunity to adapt constitutional meaning to changes
in understanding and practice over time.
A second (and somewhat conflicting) lesson involves
the importance of a culture of constitutionalism-towhich judicial review is an important contributor-to ensure against
the most egregious abuses of legal authority. In America,
judicial review has been important as a check after the
fact and, perhaps even more, as a before-the-fact deterrent to presidential illegality. A culture of constitutionalism and the rule of law, spurred by judicial review, has
helped deter presidential lawlessness in cases in which
the need for action seemed great to the president, and the
legal technicalities seemed like an irrelevance. In some
such considerations, lies the solution to a remarkable and
insufficiently analyzed paradox of American constitutionalism: a dramatically changed and strengthened presidency brought about without constitutional amendment
and nonetheless without significant illegalities.
Cass Sunstein is the Karl N. Llewellyn ProfessorofJurisprudence at the University of Chicago,the Law School
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